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 The provocative title of this conference is, “Can Virtue Be Measured?” My 
answer to this question is, “Yes, it can,” and I hasten to add, “It should be.”  I began 
thinking about whether and how to measure virtue when Jennifer Cole Wright, a 
psychologist from the College of Charleston, and I were approached to write a popular 
book on measuring virtue.  Alas, that project didn’t get anywhere, but I hope that our 
thinking about this issue might yet bear fruit.  Central to our thought is a notion suggested 
to us by one of our prospective editors.  That is the idea of virtue intelligence.
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  In part I, I 
sketch arguments for the importance of measuring virtue and sketch how the concept of 
virtue intelligence might help us to approach this venture.  In II, I articulate in more detail 
what virtue intelligence is, and, in III, situate it within philosophical theories of virtue 
(here I fear I might depart from the views of my collaborator, but I’ll leave that to her to 
judge).  In IV, I draw upon the thinking that Jen and I have done (mainly Jen’s thought) 
to briefly discuss what we believe to be some of the most innovative and exciting 
methodologies for measuring virtue now being explored.  Finally, in V, I go out on a limb 
and suggest something rather different (from which Jen might want to dissociate herself), 
inspired by my recent reading on the topic of “big data.”  
I. Why Measure Virtue?: Initial Thoughts 
 Skeptics might claim that measuring virtue is either unimportant or impossible.  
Quite frankly, I find it hard to see how anyone could think that measuring virtue is 
unimportant.  Yet some might think it an arcane topic of academic interest only, suitable 
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for debates amongst professional psychologists and philosophers.  But most of us care 
very much about virtue—we worry about whether we are good people, we look for ways 
to better ourselves, and we try to raise our children to be honest, trustworthy, and helpful, 
to have, in a word, good characters.  A recent book by Emily Bazelon, Sticks and Stones: 
Defeating the Culture of Bullying and Rediscovering the Power of Empathy and 
Character, attests to ongoing popular interest in character and the urgent social issues we 
think creating people of good character can help us to address.
2
  The popular interest in 
good character lends urgency to efforts to measure virtue.  We might want to be virtuous 
and think we know good character when we see it, but how can we reliably cultivate 
virtue unless we can measure its attainment?  Think of programs to inculcate virtue in 
schools.  Without standards and methods of measuring virtue, we cannot know whether 
we are doing the right thing or whether these programs are successful.  Not only having 
virtue, but also seeking to understand it through empirical means, is of vital importance to 
how we live our lives, educate our children, and shape our society. 
 What about those who think that measuring virtue is impossible?  Some might 
think that virtue is ineffable – a kind of special attunement or sensitivity that some people 
possess that defies capture by empirical means.  They could, in part, be right – perhaps 
there are qualitative aspects of virtue that can’t be measured – deeper levels of insight, 
nuance, and sensitivity that very virtuous people have that elude the grasp of empirical 
psychology.  In such cases we might think of an “art of virtue;” that is, we might 
conceptualize the lives and actions of the very virtuous along the lines of artistic 
endeavor, as suggested by the philosopher and novelist Iris Murdoch or the philosopher 
Friedrich Nietzsche.  Virtue so conceived would be resistant to empirical measure.  
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However, alongside the lives of the very virtuous and of those who deliberately strive to 
cultivate their virtue, we must place the lives and works of most of us.  Scientific 
measurements of virtue have the most importance and potential impact for those of us 
who live below the heights.  We who struggle to be virtuous – who don’t always know 
how to be kind or generous, who have selfish or foolish tendencies, who act impulsively 
or without sufficient sensitivity, and whose virtue is imperfect and fragile, need to know 
how to become virtuous as well as how to sustain and strengthen our virtue.  Not “better 
living through chemistry,” but, “more virtuous living through psychology,” is what we, 
the “not very virtuous,” need.  This is where the concept of virtue intelligence can make a 
difference to how we think about measuring virtue.  
 The term ‘virtue intelligence’ has two very important resonances on which I wish 
to draw.  The first is its parallel to the notions of emotional intelligence and social 
intelligence.  The second is its resemblance to the Aristotelian notion of practical wisdom 
or phronēsis.  Let me start with Aristotle to discuss virtue intelligence.   
The conception of virtue that I endorse and with which I usually work is neo-
Aristotelian.  In other words, I think Aristotle got it right by thinking that virtue is an 
entrenched disposition or character state that is regularly manifested in cross-situationally 
consistent actions.  I also think he was right when he insisted that virtuous action is 
appropriately motivated and guided by practical wisdom.  There is a great deal of nuance 
to be explored here, which I defer until the next section.  For now, I want to note that the 
term ‘virtue intelligence’ is meant to capture the notion that virtuous action proceeds 
from an agent’s mental state.  Virtue intelligence so conceived is but one element of 
virtue.  Dispositionality is another.  Finally, behavior -- actions and other responses -- is 
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the third element of virtue.  Taken together, these three elements are meant to provide 
different sites for the measurement of virtue: virtue intelligence is an agent’s mental state; 
‘dispositionality’ refers to the fact that the mental state does not occur only once or even 
a few times, but is a regular or enduring feature of someone’s personality; and behavior 
or response is the product of the agent’s virtuous disposition.  To illustrate, if a college 
student visits an old folks’ home, even regularly, only because she wants to put it on her 
resumé, she is not being virtuous and her visits do not express virtue.  This is because her 
actions proceed from a selfish mental state.  Her behavior could be deemed prosocial, but 
an Aristotelian would not call it virtuous.  If she visits only once, because she feels 
kindness or compassion for the residents, her visit can be called virtuous, but one visit is 
not enough for us to attribute to her a kind or compassionate disposition.  If she visits 
over an extended period of time (and just how long is a matter of dispute), and does so 
because she is appropriately motivated, then we can call her virtuous.   
Aristotle’s conception of virtue is robust and might be thought to defy empirical 
measurement.  Yet I think the notion of virtue intelligence could be helpful to 
psychologists in finding ways to measure the inner states so central to the Aristotelian 
conception.  Without those enduring inner states, we can’t be said to be virtuous.  This 
approach underscores the notion that virtue is not primarily about how we act (though 
that is important), but about who we are – the kinds of people we are.  The notion of 
‘character’ expresses this point: who we are makes all the difference to how we live.   
So Jen and I offer the notion of virtue intelligence as a “way into” the 
complexities of trying to measure virtue in the robust Aristotelian sense.  There are three 
advantages of using the Aristotelian conception as the focal point of virtue measurement.  
 6 
First, Aristotelian virtue ethics predominates on the contemporary philosophical scene.  
Most philosophers working in virtue ethics today endorse this conception or something 
very close to it.  Second, the conception is complex, and if it can be measured, perhaps 
less robust conceptions can be measured also.  Finally, the Aristotelian conception can be 
broken down into measurable parts.  I’ve suggested three: virtue intelligence, 
dispostionality, and behavior.  As we’ll see in the next section, virtue intelligence itself 
can be further analyzed into components.  
Let me speak now to the other important resonance conveyed by the term ‘virtue 
intelligence’ – its parallel to the notions of emotional intelligence and social intelligence.  
Emotional intelligence and social intelligence are constructs that try to “get at” notions 
widely thought to be ineffable – mastery of, or comfort with, one’s emotions and with the 
complexities of being at home in and navigating social life.  Emotional and social 
intelligence are about being savvy – being ‘smart’ or ‘tuned in’ to emotions and social 
cues, situations, etc.  These constructs are useful in enhancing our understanding of 
emotions and of the nature of our social sensitivities, and how we relate to them or 
manage them.  Being intelligent is a matter of degree.  The use of the terms emotional 
and social ‘intelligence’ implies that we can do better or worse in our emotional and 
social lives.  Psychological work on these notions informs us of what we need to know to 
do better.  And this psychological work is empirical.  Emotional and social intelligence 
have been identified as bona fide constructs and measured.  Might we do the same for 
virtue by testing for a construct called ‘virtue intelligence’?   
 In an earlier book, Virtue as Social Intelligence, I explored the social intelligence 
literature and argued that virtue is a form of social intelligence.
3
  At that time, I was not 
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thinking about the question of virtue measurement.  My more recent work with Jen marks 
something of a shift.  For the time being, I remain agnostic on the question of whether 
virtue is a form of social intelligence or whether virtue intelligence is a construct separate 
from social intelligence.  What I wish to suggest and explore, however, is whether 
thinking of the inner state component of virtue as virtue intelligence, that is, in ways that 
parallel social and emotional intelligence, can facilitate virtue measurement.  Let’s now 
turn to a more detailed account of virtue intelligence. 
II. The Construct of Virtue Intelligence  
The explanation of virtue intelligence advanced here should sound familiar, as it’s 
essentially “read off” the description of the mental state of the Aristotelian virtuous agent, 
with some modifications from my work that I regard as compatible with Aristotelianism.  
Virtue intelligence is the sine qua non of virtuous action and response.  Without it, a 
person cannot be virtuous.  It consists of a cluster of separate, yet well integrated 
capacities: for perception, reasoning and deliberation, judgment, choice, motivation, and 
affective response.  It consists of both cognitive and affective elements functioning 
together, yet, in my view, the motivational components shape the cognitive in ways that 
are essential for virtue.  An example will illustrate how these capacities work together, as 
well as the importance of motivation for shaping virtue.  
Sarah and Kate have been good friends for several years.  Sarah cares about Kate 
very much, and Kate, about Sarah.  Through no fault of her own, Kate suddenly loses her 
job, and finds her savings inadequate to see her through her financial difficulties.  Kate, 
being a rather proud person, is loath to apply for government assistance, preferring 
instead to look for other work.  Yet none is to be had, and the weeks wear on.   
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Throughout this time, Sarah has been providing emotional support, a 
compassionate ear, encouragement in the search for work, etc.  In short, Sarah has been a 
good friend to Kate.  Although a cluster of virtues comes into play in considering Sarah’s 
response to Kate, the one I want to focus on is generosity.
4
  Should Sarah make an offer 
of financial assistance to Kate?  Would doing so be truly generous?  What can we learn 
about virtue intelligence from considering the questions this scenario raises?  
Let’s consider the role of perception, or what Aristotle calls aisthesis, in virtue 
intelligence.  Sarah must first, of course, notice or perceive that Kate is in financial 
difficulty.  But her perceptions must be finely tuned to Kate’s situation.  Not only is Kate 
financially hurting, but her inability to find work and limited savings must also be 
sources of emotional distress, worry, anxiety, and so on.  Perhaps being unable to find 
work is undermining her confidence in her abilities.  Though Kate realizes, cognitively, 
that her failure to find work is through no fault of her own, still, nagging doubts about her 
qualifications recur.  Sarah, as a good friend and someone who is concerned about Kate’s 
welfare, should notice Kate’s emotional strain.  She should pick up on subtle cues that 
Kate might display, such as a tone of voice, a facial expression, or other behavioral 
nuances.  In short, the perceptual component of virtue intelligence is or incorporates 
forms of social or emotional intelligence, insofar as it includes capacities for having or 
obtaining a finely tuned awareness of others’ emotional states, as conveyed through 
behavioral signs.   
I have explored this aspect of virtue intelligence in some detail in my earlier book 
and won’t belabor these points here.  However, it’s worth noting that one’s capacities for 
social perception of the kind described here are a matter of degree.  We can be better or 
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worse at nuanced perception.  Two broad kinds of impediments can prevent one from 
having the perceptual acuity that is integral to virtue intelligence.  The first is psycho-
physical: some people, such as the autistic and sufferers of Asberger’s Syndrome, are 
prevented by psycho-physical deficiencies from having the full capacity to perceive and 
interpret social cues.  The second barrier is human frailty.  Here ignorance, whether 
willful or otherwise, of the social norms that allow one to pick up on and interpret social 
cues, is a prime offender.  Willful ignorance can take a variety of forms, and occurs when 
people simply ignore or don’t care about what is happening around them.  Consider Ken, 
an acquaintance of Kate’s.  Ken might be vaguely aware that something is the matter with 
Kate, but is too self-absorbed to take much notice.  Consequently, his perceptions of Kate 
will not be nearly sensitive enough to count as parts of virtue intelligence.  Because of his 
perceptual failure, he will be unable to respond to Kate in anything like a virtuous way.  
But the situation could be even worse with Ken.  Perhaps he is so self-centered that he 
has never even bothered to learn the social norms governing the interpretation of 
behavioral cues.  If so, perhaps Ken has seen tell-tale signs of Kate’s malaise, such as 
traces of worry, anxiety, or frustration, and not known how to interpret or “read” them.  
Ultimately, though, this ignorance stems from the fact that Ken simply does not care 
enough about other people to learn basic norms of social interaction.  This, we hope, is an 
extreme case, but is, nonetheless, a failure of virtue.   
I cannot resist digressing for a moment to note that the ability to interpret and 
respond to social cues, so essential for virtue intelligence, shows why a famous objection 
to Aristotelian virtue ethics, the “self-centeredness” objection, misses its mark.  
According to this objection, Aristotelian virtue ethics is misconceived because it urges us 
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to be self-centered – to care about our own virtue, instead of focusing on the needs of 
others.  If the foregoing remarks are correct, we cannot be virtuous unless we are able to 
see, understand, and respond to the needs of others, and we cannot have these abilities 
without social intelligence.  Virtue is deeply social.  Other-regardingness is built into its 
very nature.  Someone who cares only or even primarily about her own virtue is not truly 
virtuous; she lacks the concern for others that is at the heart of virtuous dispositions.
5
  
Let’s return to Kate and Sarah and the question of Sarah’s generosity.  We’ve 
seen that perception of a deeply social nature is integral to virtue intelligence.  A bevy of 
cognitive capacities, too, are intrinsic to it.  In the next section I will discuss the roles 
virtue intelligence plays in habitual or “second nature” virtuous responses, which do not 
require overt deliberation on the part of the virtuous agent.  For now, let’s look more 
closely at the kinds of conscious deliberation that are characteristic of virtue intelligence.   
Earlier I mentioned the need for reasoning and deliberation, judgment, and choice.  
These are all crucial cognitive elements that go into virtuous response.  In other words, a 
virtuous response will be thoughtful.  So Sarah must give some thought to how best to 
display her generosity toward Kate.  She must weigh the possibility, for example, that an 
offer of financial assistance could wound Kate’s pride, or that offering assistance in a 
certain manner could have this effect.  She must consider whether a loan or a gift would 
be appropriate.  If a loan, should she charge some token amount of interest?  Should she 
set a time limit for repayment?  She must consider whether attempting to find Kate work 
would be a better option than either a loan or a gift.  Perhaps she should simply express 
sympathy and solidarity, and ask how she can help, choosing the appropriate time and 
place to have this conversation.  In all of this, Sarah needs to make informed judgments 
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about Kate’s mental state and how she is likely to respond to overtures of assistance.  
Sarah must deliberate carefully, make judgments about the possible consequences of a 
variety of interventions available to her, and choose well how she responds to Kate’s 
situation.   
Perhaps all of these remarks about perception and cognition are straightforward 
and obvious, but there is one aspect of virtue intelligence that cannot be overlooked, nor, 
in my view, stressed enough.  That is the role that virtuous motivation plays in shaping 
both the perceptions and the cognitions of the virtuous agent.  Sarah, as a friend of 
Kate’s, sees her plight with a kind, compassionate, and generous eye, unlike Ken, who 
does not.  (This is a point that was beautifully made by the late Peter Goldie in his book 
On Personality).
6
  The feeling or love that Sarah has for Kate informs how she sees Kate, 
how she thinks about Kate, and how she plans her response to Kate.  Sarah would not see 
or think about Kate as she does if she did not feel a certain way about Kate – if she did 
not want to be a certain kind of person in her relationship with Kate.  Central to, and 
indeed, driving and informing virtue intelligence, then, are certain kinds of affective 
motivations, certain ways of wanting to be and live in the world and be and live with 
other people that shape how we see, think, and respond -- that form who we are and how 
we live.  These affective motivations and their cognitive and perceptual accompaniments 
go by certain names: generosity, kindness, compassion, courage, and so on.
7
  They are 
the Aristotelian virtues, and, I would suggest, the virtues of many other cultures and 
traditions, such as ren or benevolence in Confucianism, compassion in Buddhism, and 
Ubuntu in South African traditions.  In the Aristotelian tradition, the affective 
motivations that shape the virtues go hand in glove with practical wisdom, or phronēsis.  
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In other words, the motivational elements of the virtues, the desire to be kind or generous, 
for example, shape and are shaped by the practical deliberations one takes in one’s efforts 
to succeed in being kind, generous, and so on.  So Sarah’s desire to be truly generous 
toward Kate will motivate her to reason well in her efforts to do so, and her reasoning 
will deepen her desire, making it more sophisticated and nuanced, more rationally 
informed, more finely calibrated to Kate’s situation, indeed, a more seasoned and mature 
element of virtue.  
Let’s pause to recap the construct I’ve described as “virtue intelligence.”  It 
consists of a kind of affective motivation characteristic of the virtues, such as generosity, 
kindness, courage, compassion, and so on.  These motivations shape the deeply social 
perceptions and cognitions that are also integral to virtue intelligence.  Lacking these 
motivations, we could not say that someone genuinely has virtue intelligence, or, more 
broadly, virtue.  One can be better or worse at virtue intelligence.  Virtue intelligence is 
sometimes impaired by psycho-physical deficiencies, as occurs in cases of autism and 
Asberger’s sufferers.  Alternatively, deficiencies in virtue intelligence could result from 
human frailty, including willful factors such as selfishness or culpable ignorance.  Virtue 
intelligence is deeply social: we learn how to perceive and interpret social cues through 
socialization.  We also learn how to deliberate, judge, and choose by being taught how to 
do these things.  Most importantly, perhaps, we learn how to structure and manage our 
motivations and feelings through being taught, by our parents and others, how to do so.  
Being taught to be virtuous and to have and develop virtue intelligence is part and parcel 
of being taught how to live well.  As we grow in virtue intelligence, there should be a 
natural interplay between motivations, perceptions, and cognitions, with each element 
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influencing the others.  This is not meant to imply that we are immune from setbacks.  
Surely, we can and do make mistakes, but the virtuously intelligent person seeks to learn 
from these mishaps and to use them in the service of doing better next time.  These 
themes will be pursued more fully in the next part of my talk. 
III. Virtue Intelligence in Philosophical Perspective 
So what should Sarah do about Kate?  We left this question unanswered.  To 
answer it, we need to look more fully at Sarah’s life, at her strengths and weaknesses, at 
her goals and attitudes, at who she is and how she lives.  To do this, we need to situate 
virtue intelligence more fully within a philosophical perspective, and introduce other 
notions to supplement it, such as habituation, nonconscious mental processing, and 
dispositionality. 
Virtue intelligence is at home in a broadly Aristotelian philosophical context.  But 
there are different interpreters of Aristotle.  There are two on whose views I want to draw 
to enrich our thinking about virtue intelligence: Philippa Foot and John McDowell.  Let 
us start with Foot. 
In one very insightful remark, Foot mentions that virtues such as benevolence 
have a certain effect on how their possessor sees the world.
8
  This in itself is a very rich 
notion.  A benevolent person interprets or “reads” the world in a specific way.  Instead of 
viewing a careless comment as a deliberate insult, a benevolent person is inclined to 
shrug it off, to excuse the one who made it, or explain it away.  Her benevolence inclines 
her not to make too much of it, to give the other the benefit of the doubt.  This perceptual 
and interpretative stance of the benevolent person, I believe, is shaped by her benevolent 
motivations, by her desire to be benevolent and the influence of this desire on her 
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perceptions and cognitions.  So I believe that Foot’s vision of the virtues as expressed in 
her remark about benevolence supports the interpretation of virtue intelligence offered 
here. 
An extension of Foot’s insight is in order.  Like all of us, the virtuous person 
creates to some extent her own Lebenswelt or “life-world.”  A person who is inclined to 
be kind and friendly will elicit that reaction in others; she will seek (perhaps 
nonconsciously) situations in which those qualities are in evidence, and her overall 
outlook and attitude will have the effect of bringing those qualities into contexts where 
they might be lacking.  Instead of reacting with irritation to someone who drops papers in 
her path, she will kindly help to pick them up (whether she finds a dime or not).  Instead 
of walking past a colleague who, at a meeting, does not have a dinner partner, she will 
invite that person to join her group.  And so on.  In other words, virtue affects not only 
how one processes incoming information, but also shapes one’s actions and responses, 
and, more subtly, the “climate” or “atmosphere” that one brings to bear in one’s 
interactions.  
We can see how this construal of virtue supports the notion, adopted by Foot but 
also found in Aristotle, that virtues are correctives.
9
  They correct our own tendencies to 
vice, but they can also correct the possible lapses of others.  Our benevolent person, being 
imperfectly benevolent, might be tempted to take offense at a clumsy comment made by 
another.  Yet, if her benevolence is strong, she is able to overcome that temptation.  If she 
brings benevolence into a situation in which it is not in evidence, or worse, one very near 
to devolving into tension or hostility, her attitude, noted and appreciated by others, could 
prevent them from lapsing into hurtful or offensive behavior.  Think of how a calmly 
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spoken word, uttered in a meeting at which tempers are fraying, can soothe ruffled 
feathers. 
These reflections on aspects of Foot’s conception of virtue signal the complexity 
of virtue intelligence as a feature of individual virtues.  However, the kind of virtue 
described here cannot consist of virtue intelligence alone.  It must be deep-seated and 
enduring – more than an occurrent mental state.  Virtue must be dispositional.   
Aristotle argues that virtuous dispositions are formed through habituated action, 
and I’ve used the notion of goal-dependent automaticity to explain how this might 
occur.
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 My account, in short, goes like this.  Suppose that a person has a virtue-relevant 
goal, such as being a good parent.  Her pursuit of this goal leads her repeatedly to 
perform actions expressing virtues that good parents should have, such as kindness, 
fairness, patience, and generosity.  These actions can become habituated in the following 
way.  Her goal is likely to be repeatedly but nonconsciously activated in response to 
external cues or triggers of which she might not be consciously aware, such as the 
expression, gesture, or sound of a child in need.  These cues activate her goal, which is 
not always at the forefront of her conscious awareness, yet is chronically accessible.  She 
acts in the service of her goal without having consciously to deliberate, and her actions 
express virtue.  Repeated actions expressing virtue can become habituated over time, and 
habituated actions eventually form dispositions.  The virtuous disposition that she 
eventually forms, we can hope, will “spill over” into virtuous actions in other kinds of 
relevantly similar cases – perhaps she will respond kindly to children not her own or to a 
friend in need, thereby extending her kindness beyond the sphere of parenting.  In any 
event, this is one way in which habits can form virtuous dispositions.   
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Key to this account is the notion that virtuous dispositions cannot be formed 
unless some essential elements of virtue intelligence are in place.  Indeed, lacking 
appropriate motivation and perception, one will misperceive or miss occasions for 
virtuous action, or deliberate about them in the wrong way, or act with inappropriate 
motives.  Habituated actions performed without virtue intelligence will miss the mark of 
true virtue, and dispositions formed without the guidance of virtue intelligence will not be 
genuinely virtuous.  
A further point is worth making.  Nonconscious processing contributes to the 
habituation of virtue and the formation of virtuous dispositions.  As we become 
habituated into virtue, the need for conscious deliberation every time we act becomes 
increasingly less acute.  Eventually, as our dispositions develop, deepen, and strengthen, 
virtuous action becomes “second nature.”
11
  We act virtuously without consciously 
thinking about it.  Virtuous behavior, on this account, results from a complex 
combination of conscious and nonconscious mental processing.  The more habituated into 
virtue we become, the less we need to rely on conscious deliberation, and the more we 
are able to nonconsciously process the numerous factors that contribute to virtuous 
action.   
So far we have been considering the factors of virtue intelligence, habituation, 
dispositionality, and nonconscious processing from the perspective of a single virtue.   
Character does not consist of a single virtue alone, however, but of a plethora of virtues, 
each of which should, ideally, cohere with and support the others.  In the example of 
benevolence used a moment ago, it is clear that benevolence is related to generosity, 
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compassion, and kindness, and perhaps even to courage, if the benevolent person has to 
face situations in which hostility reigns.  
To broaden our perspective on virtue intelligence and continue to explore its 
affinities with other philosophical views of virtue, let’s turn more explicitly to 
McDowell.
12
  I want to draw specifically on two aspects of McDowell’s thinking about 
virtue, and leave one aside.  The two on which I draw are his conception of the unity of 
the virtues and his insight that the virtuous person’s conception of her life supplies her 
with a guide for how to live virtuously.   
The idea left aside is his notion that the mental state of the virtuous person is 
essentially unitary.  This is a complex and, to me, somewhat obscure notion.  By this 
McDowell means that the two distinctive elements typically used by philosophers to 
explain mental states – beliefs and desires – are, in the virtuous person, not two distinct 
kinds of mental entities, but in fact, one.  Philosophers usually explain the difference 
between beliefs and desires by invoking the idea of “direction of fit.”  Beliefs are 
traditionally used by philosophers to suggest a “world-to-mind” direction of fit.  True 
beliefs track the way the world is.  Desires, by contrast, are explained by a “mind-to-
world” fit.  My desires are about the way I want the world to be.  I might want a dish of 
ice cream.  My desire suggests a mind to world fit – I want to change the world so as to 
obtain a dish of ice cream.  I might believe something about the world that is relevant to 
my desire, namely, that there is ice cream in the fridge.  My belief, if true, can provide 
me with the information I need to satisfy my desire.  McDowell’s view, by contrast, 
denies a distinction between beliefs and desires in the psychology of the virtuous person.  
One way of expressing this is to say that McDowell holds that there are “besires,” mental 
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entities that have both directions of fit.  There are levels of complexity regarding the 
nature of besires, if such there be, as well as interpretations of McDowell, that I wish to 
avoid.  Suffice it to say that I do not agree with McDowell about the strongly unitary 
mental state of the virtuous person, though I think a quite strong unity does indeed hold 
amongst the beliefs and desires that constitute her virtuous mental state.  The virtuous 
person, in my view, has separable beliefs and desires, but, as I noted earlier, her virtuous 
desires, that is, her motivations to be and to act in kind, generous, and compassionate 
ways, shape her thoughts and perceptions.  Should her motivations change, her thoughts 
and perceptions would change also.  Though the beliefs and desires of the virtuous person 
are strongly united, they are not inseparable. 
The theme of unity is evident not only in McDowell’s notion of the unitary mental 
state of the virtuous person, but also in his strong conception of the unity of the virtues.  
Here I do want to draw on some of McDowell’s insights, while, again, eschewing some 
other aspects of his work.  For McDowell, virtue is a kind of unified sensitivity or 
perceptual capacity that enables us to see the world aright.  In this, I believe he is 
influenced by Iris Murdoch, who, in turn, is inspired by Plato.  For these thinkers, virtue 
allows us to perceive or know the good, and the good itself is attractive, having a kind of 
appeal that draws us to it.  So knowledge of the good has an inbuilt motivational 
component (hence the unitary mental state of the virtuous person).  Moreover, for 
McDowell, virtue is a single, overarching sensitivity that consists of a number of 
individual sensitivities working in harmony.  This, I think, is what he means by the 
“unity” of the virtues.  In the virtuous person, kindness, generosity, courage, justice, and 
so on, are all parts of a single sensitivity that operate cooperatively.  McDowell makes 
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clear his view that we cannot have one virtue without all the rest – I cannot be adequately 
sensitive to the requirements of justice without also being sensitive to the courage needed 
to act justly, and so on.   
The unity of virtues so conceived is a strong requirement.  We are well aware of 
some people who seem to excel in one virtue while lacking others.  Aside from this point, 
taken from our experience of virtue in the persons we encounter, I want to distance 
myself conceptually from McDowell’s view that virtue is a single sensitivity.  I incline to 
the view, held by Aristotle, that the virtues are multiple, discrete, separate dispositions.  
That said, the notion of the unity of virtues captures something important about how 
virtue functions in the overall personality of the virtuous person.  The virtues, whether we 
conceive of them as parts of a single sensitivity or as separate dispositions, are guided by 
reason, which functions as a way of “checking and balancing” the operation of the 
individual virtues in the psychological economy of the virtuous agent.  Using reason, the 
virtuous person knows when justice is called for, as opposed to mercy, or when 
generosity must be tempered with firmness.  In other words, reason enables one to 
adjudicate amongst the virtues in the course of living one’s life.  Some philosophers, such 
as Georg von Wright, have thought the ability to use reason as a higher-order regulator of 
the virtues is itself a virtue, namely, the executive virtue of self-control.
13
 
In this complex landscape of virtue, we can discern and describe various levels of 
intelligence in the virtuous person.  There is the intelligence that is intrinsic to each 
specific virtue.  One might say, for example, that benevolence has its own intelligence.  
That is, when benevolent motivations are called into play, they elicit a train of 
perceptions and cognitions that factor into the benevolent person’s reasoning about what 
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is to be done in a specific situation that she recognizes as calling for benevolence.  I have 
been speaking about virtue intelligence in these terms – as the kind of intelligence that is 
integral to each specific virtue.  My description of the unity of the virtues conjures a 
different level of intelligence, one in which reasoning is not specific to, and one might 
say, contained within, a virtue, but stands outside the virtues, managing them and 
adjudicating them.  Thus there seems to be a second order or higher level of intelligence 
involved in regulating the operation of various virtues.  The virtuous person must be able 
to “stand outside” the motivations and reasoning intrinsic to each specific virtue, or she 
will not be able to make judicious decisions about which virtue to act upon should virtues 
conflict or even overlap.   
Moreover, she will not be able to discern when virtue is truly called for and when 
it isn’t.  Consider, for example, a case adapted from Adam Smith.
14
  Smith describes a 
case in which we feel sympathy for someone we see being beaten.  When we discover 
that the beating is a just punishment for that person’s transgression, Smith believes we 
should temper our reaction so that our sympathy is checked.  In other words, he believes 
our sympathy should be reasons-responsive.  A similar point obtains with respect to the 
virtues.  Upon seeing a person being disciplined, I might react with compassion – I see 
the scenario as described by Smith, say, and this triggers my compassionate motivation.  
Yet, my compassion, which includes my desire to be compassionate toward the person I 
see, as well as any thoughts that follow from it, must be responsive to further information 
that casts the situation in a different light.  I believe that the higher level of intelligence 
possessed by the virtuous enables us to be reasons-responsive in this way – in ways that 
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temper our initial virtue-relevant reactions to situations and curtail or check what would 
otherwise have been inappropriate, but well-intentioned, actions. 
How does the virtuous person come to possess this higher-order intelligence?  
How can she develop it so as to shape and guide the operation of different virtues in her 
life?  For this, McDowell offers the answer: her conception of her own life as a virtuous 
person provides her with guidance, or, we might say, with an overarching framework 
within which she is able to work out the requirements of daily living.  If one has a 
conception of oneself as a person who is just or kind or compassionate, who is committed 
to being a certain kind of person and to upholding certain values in one’s life, this 
provides a set of “anchor points” that aid one in thinking through what needs to be done 
in specific contexts.  What we are exploring now is how one’s identity as a virtuous 
person enables one to guide one’s life.  If I see myself as a person committed to justice, 
for example, my initial compassionate reaction to rush to the aid of someone I perceive as 
the victim of injustice will be tempered when I learn that he is receiving just punishment 
for having transgressed.  I will be responsive to reasons of justice, and this reasons-
responsiveness will lead me to readjust my compassionate reaction.  I might still feel 
compassion for the suffering of the individual, but restrain myself from interfering with 
his punishment in response to the demands of justice.  We can see now that how Sarah 
should respond to Kate depends on the extent to which her generosity is reasons-
responsive, that is, is informed by Sarah’s higher-order intelligence.  This, in turn, is 
shaped by Sarah’s moral identity – by the conception Sarah has of herself as a certain 
kind of virtuous person.  What Sarah should do depends in part on how she sees herself 
as a virtuous person.  We can underscore this point by noting that Sarah’s reflections 
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about Kate proceed from the first-person perspective.  Sarah asks herself, “What should I 
do about Kate?”  Perhaps, if she is stumped, or in the grips of philosophical theory, she 
will ask herself, “What would a generous person do about Kate?”  But if she asks herself 
that more abstract question, her answer must ultimately be grounded in the realities of her 
own life, as well as of Kate’s situation and her relationship with Kate.  In the life of the 
virtuous agent, abstract questions about virtuous action are resolved with first-personal 
deliberations and answers.   
Sarah’s view of herself as virtuous should be tethered to reality – to how Sarah 
actually is as a virtuous person.  (Here I can only mention that Daniel Cervone’s work on 
knowledge and appraisal mechanisms supplies an empirically informed way of 
explaining how Sarah might ensure that both her virtue and her self-conception as 
virtuous are reality-responsive).
15
  How she is as a virtuous person is a result of her life 
history and moral development.  Volumes could be said on these points, but to make a 
long story very short and bring the discussion back to our point of departure, her moral 
development into virtue begins, but does not end with, virtue intelligence.
16
  As children, 
we are taught by our parents and other caretakers to be kind, generous, compassionate, 
and courageous – to share our toys, comfort others in need, and stand up to bullies.  We 
are taught the individual virtues and encouraged to want to have them.  We are taught to 
use our own reason in acting in generous, compassionate, and courageous ways – to 
intelligently adapt our virtuous responses to the situations that confront us.  The shape 
our virtues take depends on the circumstances of our lives, as well as on other factors, 
such as our temperament.  Virtue intelligence, I’ve argued, is at the heart of the 
possession and successful exercise of the individual virtues.  It is also central to the 
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development of the virtues as dispositions – to the nonconscious processing and 
habituation of virtue. 
Moving beyond the individual virtues, we encounter a higher order of intelligence 
when we recognize reason as enabling the virtuous person to manage the cluster of 
virtues she possesses – knowing when to act virtuously or to forbear (e.g., feeling 
compassion but not acting), recognizing and responding appropriately to the reasons that 
might favor one virtuous response over another of a different type (e.g., in Sarah’s case, 
patiently waiting for Kate’s situation to improve, instead of immediately making a 
generous offer), and adjudicating virtues when they conflict (e.g., justice vs. mercy). The 
intelligence needed to navigate these challenges develops as part of a person’s life 
journey.  This journey is examined: the virtuous person comes to know herself through 
thinking about how to act and how to be in the world.  She develops a distinctive moral 
identity – a conception of herself as a person with a certain kind of character – one who is 
predominantly kind, for example, or sensitive to injustices.  None of this occurs in a 
social vacuum.  The virtuous person develops her character and her conception of herself 
in the company of others – supportive family, friends, and communities. 
IV. Measuring Virtue: Paths Yet to be Taken 
Where does all of this leave us on virtue measurement?  It leaves us in three 
places.  The first is that it fosters an awareness of the complexity of virtue.  Behavioral 
measures by themselves are not enough to ensure that we are measuring truly virtuous 
action, nor, given participant bias, are self-report measures alone entirely reliable.  The 
cross-correlation of multiple measures must be used in empirical research on virtue.  I am 
all in favor of bringing the array of methods used in psychology to bear on empirical 
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measurements of virtue – behavioral measures, self-reports, observer-reports, Q sorts, etc.  
Moreover, as I’ve stressed here, internal factors, such as motivations, cognitions, and 
dispositionality, are central components of virtue that psychologists cannot ignore.   
Second, there is an urgency involved in “getting it right.”  Society, by which I 
mean all of us, have a vested interest in raising people of good character.  To do this – to 
actually raise good, virtuous people – we need to know what virtue is and how to 
encourage it.  But virtue is complex and messy.  These facts, however, shouldn’t deter 
psychologists or other social scientists who seek to contribute to virtue measurement.  We 
are at the beginning of what I hope is a new era of exploration in virtue measurement.   
Third, virtue intelligence provides a point of entry for measurements of virtue 
that, eventually, will be sufficiently nuanced and sophisticated to capture much of the 
complexity of virtue.  Yet, as noted earlier, it could well be that some aspects of virtue’s 
complexity, for example, the nuance and depth of virtuous response as expressed by a 
truly virtuous person, elude empirical measurement.  This point notwithstanding, 
empirical measures can bring us closer to understanding what virtue is, who possesses it, 
and to what degree.   
My collaborator, Jennifer Cole Wright, and I have discussed ways in which virtue 
could be measured using familiar psychological methods.  Though she will discuss these 
ideas in more detail in her presentation, I would like to mention some of them here.   
As Jen will explain, the empirical study of virtue includes measurements of: (a) 
people’s sensitivity to trait-relevant stimuli, whether internal or external; (b) their ability 
to recognize and generate trait-appropriate responses, whether cognitive, affective, or 
behavioral; (c) the dispositionality of their sensitivity and ability to recognize and 
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generate trait-appropriate responses; and (d) the chronic accessibility of trait-oriented 
values and goals and trait-relevant identity.  Jen will discuss operational definitions of 
these notions and strategies for measuring them.  However, it should be clear from the 
brief mention I make of them here that the measurement of (a) and (b) would provide 
some evidence of virtue intelligence or indicate its absence.  Virtue intelligence is at least 
partly operationalized through the measurement of people’s sensitivities and abilities to 
recognize and generate trait-appropriate responses.  The measurement of (c) and (d), 
however, takes us well beyond virtue intelligence.  Dispositionality takes us into the 
terrain of virtuous character.  Measurements of the chronic accessibility of trait-oriented 
values and goals and trait-relevant identity take us toward the heart of the conception of 
the virtuous person sketched here.  It opens paths for measuring to what extent people 
have truly internalized virtue-relevant values and goals and see themselves as people of 
good character – as people who are kind, generous, and compassionate – not just in the 
present moment, but at all times and on all occasions when such virtues are required.   
Jen and I have also thought about the innovative work in virtue measurement 
being pursued by psychologist Mattias Mehl and his colleagues.  This research uses a 
device known as the Electronically Activated Recorder (EAR).  Pioneered by Mehl and 
his colleagues, the EAR is a recording device worn voluntarily by participants in research 
studies.  Mehl and his colleagues have used the EAR in numerous experiements.
17
  The 
EAR runs on a personal digital assistant (PDA) or hand-held computer, and is worn 
attached to the clothing of subjects.
18
  Also, an iEAR app that runs on both the iPhone 
and the iPod touch is available on free download from iTunes.  This operating system has 




Mehl and his colleagues have used the EAR to study virtue.  In research funded 
by The John Templeton Foundation under the auspices of “The Character Project,” they 
have used the EAR to record and analyze virtue-relevant behavior in daily life.
20
  The aim 
of their project is “. . . to shed new light on questions around the existence of moral 
character by (1) examining the convergence among behavioral, self-report, and 
informant-report measures of moral character and (2) testing the stability, variability, and 
changeability of virtuous daily behavior relative to (non-virtuous) neutral and negative 
daily behavior using a novel, naturalistic observation sampling method.”
21
  They are 
supplementing self-report data with other measures, thereby correcting for one of the 
drawbacks in the use of self-reporting technologies—namely, participant bias.  Another 
possible drawback, the intrusiveness of self-report devices, is also avoided, as Mehl and 




The database used for their “Character Project” study was four samples: 76 
healthy adults, 12 arthritis patients, 52 breast cancer patients, and 50 partners of breast 
cancer patients.
23
  They found that “Naturalistically observed virtuous daily behavior 
shows substantial temporal stability,” and these stability levels are consistent with past 
research on trait-relevant behavior and with negative and neutral daily behavior.
24
   
These results are impressive and promising.  However, Jen and I wonder if data 
provided by the EAR provides a sufficiently nuanced window onto the complexities of 
virtue.  Motive and context affects what counts as virtuous behavior.  For example, an 
individual might say something that appears virtuous, but not be appropriately motivated.  
I might give you a compliment that appears kind on a recording, but if my motive is 
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solely to ingratiate myself with you, I am being insincere and not truly kind.  My 
statement does not reflect true virtue, according to Aristotelian-inspired conceptions of 
virtue.  Similarly, context matters in determining whether behavior is truly virtuous, and 
the nuances of context are not always picked up by recordings made with the EAR.  The 
EAR might record me telling you I’m hungry and asking for food, and record you 
offering me a cookie.  This response might make you appear generous in the sense that 
you share your food with me, but if you have far more food that you are withholding 
from me, your gesture might, in fact, be stingy.  The background context of your having 
access to more food than you offer is not captured by the recording, and this makes a 
difference to how the recorded statement should be interpreted – as expressing virtue or 
not. 
We hope that by introducing the notion of virtue intelligence, as well as by 
suggesting the importance of virtue-relevant goals, dispositionality, and virtue-relevant 
identity for virtue measurement, we can move empirical discussions forward by 
identifying key constituents of virtue.  Researchers can then be alerted to look for these 
elements given the measurement techniques currently on offer, but also to develop new 
ways of measuring the influence of motivation and context on what looks like virtuous 
behavior and/or speech that reflects virtuous behavior, but might not, on closer 
inspection, be virtuous after all.  In short, Jen and I believe that use of the EAR is an 
important step forward, and that future work will yield significant advances in the crucial 
venture of measuring virtue.  
V. Out on a Limb: Can “Big Data” Make a Difference? 
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 Recently I did some reading about “big data.”
25
  According to that paragon of 
research insights, Wikipedia, “Big data is the term for a collection of data sets so large 
and complex that it becomes difficult to process using on-hand database management 
tools or traditional data processing applications.”
26
  The authors continue, “Big data 
usually includes data sets with sizes beyond the ability of commonly used software tools 
to capture, curate, manage, and process the data within a tolerable elapsed time.  Big data 
sizes are a constantly moving target, as of 2012 ranging from a few dozen terabytes to 
many petabytes of data in a single data set.”
27
  Big data has been made possible by the 
transition from analog to digital technologies.  It is now possible to collect and store 
massive amounts of data from the internet, cellular telephone conversations, text 
messaging, and other forms of electronic communication.  Diagram 1 gives an idea of 
how the transition from analog to digital information technologies has changed our access 
to data.  As digital technologies continue to evolve, we can expect capacities for data 
collection, management, and storage to increase.   
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Diagram 1.  From Analog to Digital.  
 Some uses of big data have yielded impressive results.  The aforementioned 
Wikipedia article mentions uses of big data in science, government, international 
development, financial markets, architecture, and the private sector.
28
  One big data feat 
mentioned there is the decoding of the human genome.  Initially it took ten years to do 
this; using big data the human genome can be decoded in less than a week.  Equally if not 
more impressive was Google’s ability to predict with more speed and accuracy than the 
United States Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) the outbreak and spread 
of the H1N1 flu in the United States in 2009.
29
  The CDC collected data from doctors and 
tabulated it once a week.  This method was both slow and inaccurate.  People could wait 
for weeks before seeing a doctor, and slow tabulation methods meant delays in accessing 
 30 
useable data.  Google circumvented all of this by using a big data approach.  They took 
the 50 million most common search terms typed by Americans and compared it with 
CDC data on the spread of flu between 2003 and 2008.  They guessed that searches might 
be aimed at getting flu-relevant information, for example, “medicine for cough and 
fever.”  However, this wasn’t relevant to them – they didn’t know and designed a system 
that didn’t care what the search terms were.  The system searched for correlations 
between the frequency of certain search questions and the flu’s spread over time and 
space.  Google processed 450 million different mathematical models in order to “. . . test 
the search terms, comparing their predictions against actual flu cases from the CDC in 
2007 and 2008. … [T]heir software found a combination of 45 search terms that, when 
used together in a mathematical model, had a strong correlation between their prediction 
and the official figures nationwide.”
30
  Like the CDC, Google knew where the flu had 
spread in 2009, but, unlike the CDC, they knew it in almost real time, not a week or two 
after the flu had hit. 
 I will admit to being very impressed by the Google story and by others of the uses 
of big data.  I speculate that a “big data” approach might be useful in empirical studies of 
virtue.  How might this work?  
 Big data gathered from various sources might prove useful in identifying different 
populations of potential research subjects – people who, for various reasons, might be 
interested in virtue.  For example, amazon.com has troves of data about book purchases 
and browsing.  Might people who have browsed for books on virtue-relevant topics, such 
as compassion, hope, or various dimensions of spirituality, be interested in learning about 
virtue, and perhaps, be predisposed to develop virtue or act virtuously in their lives, or 
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better, already be virtuous and desire to deepen and strengthen their virtue?  Histories of 
charitable giving are another possible source of information about people who could be 
interested in virtue.  If people have given online to charities that protect animals or the 
environment, or promote causes such as typhoon relief or the Special Olympics, might 
those people be predisposed to virtue or already be virtuous  -- might they have or want 
to have compassion for animals, care and stewardship of the environment, or benevolence 
toward others in need?  If they give regularly, does this indicate dispositionality in a 
virtue – a commitment to compassionate behavior toward animals over time, for 
example?  If people have done searches on specific topics, such as caregiving for 
relatives suffering from Alzheimer’s, could these searches indicate populations in whom 
the seeds of virtue have taken or might take hold – do these searches suggest a concern 
for Alzheimer’s victims that motivates people to seek further information?  Are those 
motivated to seek further information also possessors of virtue intelligence?  Perhaps 
other search terms could be identified that would uncover further populations who seem 
to show signs of virtue intelligence.  
The general idea is to use the resources of big data to identify populations in 
which more targeted studies of virtue might bear fruit.  Psychologists, anthropologists, 
and sociologists might regard these populations as potentially promising research subjects 
for the study of specific virtues, or of the development of virtue in specific contexts, such 
as that of providing care for elderly relatives.  As a side note, when I explained this idea 
to a colleague, he remarked that social conditions play roles in shaping the populations 
we study to learn about virtue.  Earlier in the twentieth century, he remarked, people 
would have looked for ways to care for children with polio, but now, as our society ages, 
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we need to find ways to care for the elderly, and the nature of our caregiving, as well as 
our virtue, is shaped by these circumstances – by the age groups requiring care and the 
diseases from which they suffer.
31
   
 In short, I would encourage The John Templeton Foundation to take seriously the 
promise of a “big data” approach to the empirical study of virtue.  A partnership between 
JTF and Google or amazon.com could be exciting and yield data for more fine-grained 
study.  Results in many other areas of big data analysis have been impressive.  Unlike the 
other approaches to virtue measurement noted here, a “big data” approach is “out on a 
limb,” and “outside the box.”  But what is the impetus toward virtue measurement, if not 




                                                        
1
 William Frucht of Yale University Press suggested this idea to us.  I thank Jennifer Cole 
Wright for graciously allowing me to use our shared work, in particular, her important 
ideas about virtue measurement, in this presentation.  
2 See Bazelon (2013). 
3 See Snow (2010). 
4 For a similar example highlighting the complexities of generosity, see Russell 
(forthcoming). 
5
 Someone might claim that this is too swift a move.  The self-centeredness objection 
concerns the structure of virtuous motivation.  According to the objection, those who 
aspire to be virtuous must do so for self-centered reasons, namely, for an objectionable 
concern with one’s own virtue.  Proponents of the objection would assert that it is 
possible to have the kinds of other-regarding sensitivities and attunements required for 
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virtue and yet be motivated to be virtuous out of a concern for one’s own virtue or moral 
state.  After all, according to social intelligence theory, other-regarding sensitivities are 
compatible with morally neutral or morally bad motives.  Even if virtue is deeply social, 
why should it not be compatible with self-centered reasons for wanting to be virtuous?  In 
reply, we need to admit that it is both conceptually and psychologically possible for a 
person to have other-regarding sensitivities, even those integral to specific virtues, and 
yet be motivated to pursue virtue for self-centered reasons.  But we would not regard 
such a person as fully virtuous or even as very mature in virtue.  The fully virtuous 
person has become so accustomed to acting for the sake of the other that concern with 
furthering her own virtue through virtuous action fades away; it is not a salient part of her 
motivational landscape.  That is, even if, in early stages of virtue development, a person 
acts in virtuous and thus, other-regarding ways, but for the sake of her own virtue, it is 
still possible for the deeply other-regarding nature of virtue to take hold of her psyche, so 
to speak, and replace her self-directed concern.  In other words, as we grow in virtue, our 
truly virtuous motivations, which are deeply social and other-regarding, become stronger 
and more fully entrenched, eventually displacing less mature concerns with acting for the 
sake of our own virtue or virtuous development. 
6 See Goldie (2004). 
7 This view resonates with that of Zagzebski (1996).  
8
 I can now no longer find the passage in which this remark appears, but I believe it is in 
one of the papers in Foot (1978) in which she addresses differences in justifying a moral 
claim to someone who takes a moral, as opposed to a nonmoral, perspective. 
9 Foot (1978, 8); Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, 1109a10ff. 
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10 See Aristotle, 1103a15ff; Snow (2010), chapter 2. 
11 See McDowell (1998), “Two Sorts of Naturalism.” 
12 My thinking about McDowell is here indebted to McDowell (1998), “Virtue and 
Reason.” 
13 Von Wright (1963, 149). 
14 For general discussion, see Smith (1979, 71-73). 
15 See Snow (2012).  
16
 Some theorists urge that preconditions for the development of virtue begin earlier, even 
in the womb.  See, for example, Narvaez, Panksepp, Schore, and Gleason (2012). 
17
 See Mehl and Pennbaker (2003); Mehl et. al. (2001); and Mehl and Conner (2012), Ch. 
10.   
18 See Mehl and Conner (2012), Ch. 10, 178.   
19 Mehl et. al. (2012, 411).   
20
 See Mehl, Vazire, and Doris (2013).  Jen and I discuss this with the kind permission of 
Professor Mehl and his colleagues and thank them for sharing their power point 
presentation with us. 
21 See Mehl, Vazire, and Doris (2013), slide 3.  
22 See Handbook, Ch. 10, 180.   
23 See Mehl, Vazire, and Doris, (2013), slide 9.  
24
 Ibid., slide 14. 
25
 See Mayer-Schönberger and Cukier (2013). 




                                                                                                                                                                     
28 Ibid. 
29 Mayer-Schönberger and Cukier (2013), 1-3. 
30
 Ibid., 2. 
31
 I am grateful to Clark Gilpin for sharing this important insight. 
32
 I thank The John Templeton Foundation for their ongoing interest in my work and The 
Jubilee Centre, especially Professor Kristján Kristjánsson, for inviting me to speak at this 
conference. 
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